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As the Virginia governor, Thomas Jefferson, sat 
down to meet with Jean Baptiste Ducoigne in 1781, he did 
not know what to expect from the chief of the Kaskaskia 
who traveled to Virginia from the Illinois Country. The 
Americans had limited but peaceful contact with Illinois 
Indians. Ducoigne approached this meeting as many of his 
ancestors had when they first encountered Frenchmen in 
the Great Lakes region over 100 years before.
He began the meeting with an exchange of gifts and 
the smoking of the calumet. Jefferson gave Ducoigne a 
medal as a gift, while Ducoigne offered painted buffalo 
skins. These were not simply diplomatic procedures 
for the Kaskaskia chief, but instead the gifts and rituals 
symbolized the opportunistic nature of the Illinois 
Indians as well as their longstanding policy of forming 
alliances with European powers. The painted buffalo skins 
exemplified how proficient the Illinois Indians had become 
at not only hunting the buffalo but also transforming it into 
art.
From an American perspective, Jefferson was trying 
to extend his friendship by showing that his people were 
not like the British; they were willing to work with the 
Kaskaskia, much like the French did. Jefferson left this 
meeting with a sense of how a successful alliance with 
the Illinois could later open up inroads into the Illinois 
Country or at least quell fighting among other Native 
Americans in the region. Jean Baptiste Ducoigne left 
this meeting with a very different mindset. Much like 
his ancestors, Ducoigne hoped to forge a mutual alliance 
with the Americans to promote trade and strengthen his 
people’s position in the Illinois Country.
The Illinois Indians were an opportunistic group, 
and the Illinois experience in the eighteenth century must 
be coupled with their experience with the Americans to 
explain why the Illinois felt an alliance with the United 
States was their best option. This article will not only show 
why the Illinois Indians chose to side with the Americans, 
but also the consequences of their actions. The decision 
to align with the United States caused both internal and 
external problems for the Illinois Indians. Internally, it 
led to the splitting of the Peoria from the Illinois, while 
externally it resulted in constant attacks from other Native 
American groups. Together, these problems made it 
increasingly difficult for the Illinois to negotiate favorable 
treaties with the United States.
To understand the Illinois Indians’ decisions, it is 
crucial to recognize their motives. The very nature of the 
Illinois’ coming to the Illinois Country illustrates their 
resourcefulness and adaptability when faced with unstable 
conditions. The Illinois were relative newcomers to the 
region and were not descendants of the large city-state 
of Cahokia. Instead, they were an Algonquian speaking 
people who moved west into the Illinois Country from the 
Ohio Valley during the 1600s. The Illinois left the Ohio 
Valley as it was suffering from climate change that made 
agriculture difficult. The struggle for resources caused a 
period of violence and warfare that made it quite difficult 
for these Algonquian groups to survive.1 Small settlements 
survived by trading with the Oneota people who moved 
into the Cahokia region after the city-state’s demise. In 
the 1500s, the Algonquian groups of the Ohio Valley and 
the Oneota people in the Illinois Country began to trade 
prestige items and other goods across a trade network that 
spanned modern-day Indiana.2 It is here where we can 
see small pieces of a distinctive Illinois culture coming 
together. For example, the calumet pipe, a diplomatic tool 
used by many of the western Siouan-speakers, came into 
the Algonquian culture through this trade. The Illinois 
Indians used the calumet extensively, and they were able 
to blend several aspects of Algonquian and Oneota culture 
to form an Illinois culture that differed from many other 
Great Lakes people the French would encounter.3
The Illinois also took advantage of a large-scale 
movement of bison into the Midwestern grasslands from 
A view of Monks Mound, Cahokia, Illinois. (Image: Gerald Rogers)
Left–View from Fort Kaskaskia overlooking the Mississippi River and where the Kaskaskia village was located. (Image: 
Gerald Rogers)
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the west. Between 1500 and 1800, an influx of bison 
brought tremendous change to native life in the Illinois 
Country, and the Illinois took full advantage of this 
situation. The bison transformed the grasses of the prairie 
from a farming nuisance into a productive source of 
calories. Bison changed the Illinois into the only bison-
based Algonquian group, which emphasized the Illinois’ 
ability to adapt and take advantage of their surroundings.4 
A shift from an agricultural source of calories quickly 
shifted to a hunting- and animal-based diet. One 
archeological study suggests that when Europeans began 
to enter the Illinois Country, the majority of meat in the 
Illinois diet was from bison.5 
Bison hunting began to shape the Illinois way of life 
and demanded a communal form of hunting that varied 
drastically from the solitary style of deer hunting. Robert 
Michael Morrissey argues that this style of hunting helped 
to form a more unified and cohesive society, a way of 
life that required larger villages which stayed together 
throughout the year. Instead of breaking into small 
villages to chase deer and bears like many Algonquian 
groups, the Illinois came together in large villages, 
especially during the summer and winter months, to hunt 
bison.6 Bison hunting helped make the Illinois prosperous 
by allowing them to have an abundance of food and 
engage in other artistic endeavors. For instance, hide 
painting became an important medium that the Illinois 
employed well into the nineteenth century. Even upon 
contact, Jesuit explorer Father Jacques Marquette (1637–
1675), noticed how the Illinois “use the hides for making 
fine Robes, which they paint in various Colors.”7 The 
Illinois’ commitment to the bison illustrates an additional 
way in which they made the most of their situation while 
forming a distinct Illinois culture.
The Illinois Indians opportunistically settled the 
Illinois Country and strategically positioned themselves 
as middlemen between the Algonquian- and Siouan- 
speaking people. Their mixed cultural traits and 
positioning between these two worlds helped them thrive 
in one very large aspect of their culture: the slave trade. 
Like many other Algonquian groups, kinship played a 
prominent role in the Illinois culture and was a crucial 
factor in the Illinois slave trade. Establishing a broad 
kinship network often meant gaining status or power in 
trade, warfare, and politics.8 The centrality of kinship 
networks to the Illinois and other Algonquian groups 
Population Estimates for the Illinois
 Kaskaskia Peoria
 Years Total Population Years Total Population
 1675–1677 5,950–6,250 1673 8,000 in 3 villages
 1707 2,200 includes Tamaroa 1707 3,000
 1750 900 includes Michigamea and Cahokia 1750 1,000
 1800 100 1800 400
By1832, the combined population of the Kaskaskia and Peoria was reduced to a single village of 300. (Figures from 
Emily J. Blassingham, “The Depopulation of the Illinois Indians Part 2,” Ethnohistory 3, 4 (Autumn 1956): 362–72.)
Contraction of Illinois Indian territory, 1650–1832. Map by Robert E. 
Warren and James S. Oliver, Illinois State Museum. (Image: Robert E. 
Warren and John A. Walthall. 1998. Illini Indians in the Illinois Country, 
1673–1832. The Living Museum, 60(1): 4-8.)
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explains how slave raids 
helped to replace the deceased 
members of these kinship 
networks. Captives could be 
adopted into the family to 
replace the dead. A Jesuit in the 
Illinois Country explained this 
practice as “resuscitating the 
dead.” He stated, “When there 
is any man to be resuscitated, 
that is to say, if any one of 
their warriors has been killed 
. . . they give to this cabin one 
of the prisoners, who takes the 
places of the deceased; and this 
is what they call ‘resuscitating 
the dead.’”9 However, only true 
strangers could take the place of 
the dead. Algonquian-speaking 
captives were often useless 
because they would have to be 
adopted into a kinship network 
where they already had ties. 
For the Algonquian people of 
the Great Lakes, the Siouan-
speaking groups from the west 
made excellent candidates for 
slaves because they had no 
kinship ties to the Algonquian 
world. Since strangers were 
needed to replace the kinship 
networks, the Illinois had a 
strategic advantage when it 
came to the slave trade. 
Situated between the Great Lakes and the Siouan-
speaking tribes of the west, the Illinois displayed their 
opportunistic nature by becoming middlemen along this 
slave-trade route. Throughout the 1600s, the Illinois were 
engaged in wars with several groups in the Missouri 
Valley to obtain slaves. The Pawnee, Osage, Missouri, 
and other smaller groups to the south and west bore the 
brunt of Illinois slaving raids. The Illinois viewed these 
groups as a convenient and vulnerable source of slaves 
for the Indian slave trade that thrived in the Great Lakes 
region.10 The Illinois even engaged in war with both the 
Iroquois to the east and Siouan tribes to the west at the 
same time. While the Jesuit priest Claude Allouez (1622–
1689) saw this as a reckless act, it was actually an example 
of the Illinois being opportunistic in the slave trade.11 
The Illinois were resourceful enough to realize that their 
position in the Illinois Country was an advantage.  
When Marquette first arrived at an Illinois village in 
1673, he was greeted by a dance featuring the calumet 
pipe, treated to a feast of bison meat, offered belts and 
garters from Illinois Indians wearing buffalo skins, and 
even presented with a slave.12 This routine is strikingly 
similar to the gifts and procedures of Ducoigne’s visit 
with Thomas Jefferson. There is a sense of continuity and 
similarity of mindset between the two visits that cannot 
be overlooked. These offerings 
highlight the fact that the 
Illinois took advantage of their 
proximity to and the resources 
of the Illinois Country to forge 
a unique culture that blended 
both Algonquian and Siouan 
cultures. By using the bison and 
optimizing the slave trade, the 
Illinois positioned themselves 
favorably in the Illinois Country 
and were often feared by their 
Native American neighbors. The 
Menominee warned Marquette 
before he arrived with the Illinois 
to not travel any further south 
than the Fox River. Beyond the 
river lived the Illinois, who were 
“ferocious people.”13 The Illinois 
colonized the Illinois Country 
through aggression, fear, and 
trade. They continued to employ 
these same techniques well after 
contact and into negotiations 
with the United States. The 
political structure of the Illinois 
before European contact has 
been debated by historians, 
but the word “confederacy” is 
useful when examining Illinois 
political decisions.14 Each village 
within the confederacy was equal 
and relatively autonomous, but 
they met together regularly to reach important political 
decisions as a cohesive unit. The Illinois had strong 
The lower Illinois Country as the Kaskaskia 
understood it in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. (Image: Edward S. Ellis, The 
History of our Country: From the Discovery of 
America to the Present Time, 8 vols, 1910)
A depiction of Father Jacques Marquette and Louis Jolliet at 
the village of Kaskaskia at Starved Rock in 1673. Painting 
done by artist Robert Thorn for the state’s sesquicentennial in 
1968. (Image: Northern Illinois University Archives)
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ethnic and cultural bonds well before European contact. 
For instance, when Marquette arrived at the village of 
Peoria in the 1670s, he asked to whom he was speaking 
and the answer was, “We are Illinois.”15 This collection 
of groups identified ethnically as Illinois, but there was 
also a political side to the term “Illinois.” The Illinois 
confederacy had a great chief, and Marquette made note 
of this fact when he was taken to Kaskaskia where he was 
told the great chief lived.16 Despite this position of a great 
chief, the Illinois did not form a chiefdom because the 
great chief did not have a great deal of power. Instead, the 
great chief was a hereditary position held by the chief of 
the Kaskaskia, and his primary function was to regulate 
meetings between the bands rather than to monopolize 
power. The Illinois confederacy met periodically to go to 
war as a unit, decide the fate of slaves captured in battle, 
negotiate for trade items with other Native Americans, 
and discuss possible alliances both with Europeans and 
other Indians. During these meetings, the chiefs of all the 
villages would gather for feasts and resolve political issues 
under the direction of the great chief. The confederacy, 
then, was one of mutual support and collective decision-
making. 
The relative autonomy of various bands within the 
Illinois confederacy provided them the flexibility to 
adapt to Europeans in divergent ways. As the eighteenth 
century progressed, the localized autonomy of some 
bands strengthened, eventually fracturing the Illinois 
confederacy. The political and cultural differences among 
the bands allowed divisions to occur that weakened and 
eventually supplanted the larger Illinois confederacy. The 
individual bands chose to dissolve their confederacy as a 
way to protect their way of life.  From the late eighteenth 
and into the nineteenth century, the bands among the 
Illinois confederacy prioritized local decisions over the 
goals of the larger confederacy. Factions within the larger 
Illinois confederacy formed and gained autonomy from 
the confederacy to create separate political and cultural 
entities. The local autonomy allowed for some bands 
to alter their culture and political structure much more 
drastically than other bands, while the internal policies of 
the Illinois confederacy shifted to adjust to, align with, or 
reject the various incoming European nations. 
For the Illinois confederacy the eighteenth century 
was a major turning point because some bands were 
simultaneously coming together while others began 
to fragment. This dual process of coalescence and 
fragmentation occurred differently for each band. Some 
smaller factions of the Illinois confederacy became 
absorbed into larger groups, but at the same time there 
was a pivotal split occurring between the Kaskaskia and 
Peoria that pulled the Illinois confederacy in different 
directions. The smaller bands slowly gravitated toward 
either the Kaskaskia or Peoria and eventually combined 
with them. The Cahokia, Michigamea, and parts of the 
Tamaroa followed the Kaskaskia strategy of aligning 
themselves with a European nation to promote trade, 
seek protection, gain material goods, or disseminate 
the Christian religion. The Peoria, on the other hand, 
chose to use a strategy that often distanced them from 
Europeans while outright rejecting the Christian religion. 
By the end of the eighteenth century, it is clear that the 
bands had become autonomous entities, and the Illinois 
confederacy collapsed. Instead of uniting to preserve 
the culture of the Illinois, the local autonomy of the 
bands allowed the different groups to diverge in order to 
preserve their respective vision of an Illinois culture. The 
localized structure of the Illinois confederacy gave them a 
mechanism to survive in a way quite different from most 
groups. Instead of coming together to preserve the larger 
group, the Illinois endured by separating into smaller, 
localized groups.
In addition, the geographical distance between the 
Kaskaskia and Peoria often strained the limits of the 
confederacy and helped to promote local decisions. Before 
the eighteenth century, the Peoria and Kaskaskia lived 
relatively close to each other in the Starved Rock region 
on the Illinois River in present-day northern Illinois. In the 
fall of 1700, the Illinois faced a split with the Kaskaskia, 
moving southward to the west bank of the Mississippi 
River. Three years later the Kaskaskia moved again, 
50 miles further south near the mouth of the Kaskaskia 
George Catlin, Pah-me-cow-ee-tah, or Man Who Tracks, a 
Peoria Illinois Chief, 1830. (Image: Illinois State Museum)
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River.17 With a heavy reliance on European goods, the 
Kaskaskia moved southward to be close to the Louisiana 
Territory. Father Jacques Gravier (1651–1708) believed 
that the only thing that stopped the Kaskaskia from 
entering the Louisiana Territory was their strong Catholic 
ties to the mission.18 This left the two main areas of Illinois 
concentration near Lake Peoria and the mouth of the 
Kaskaskia River. 
The Peoria protested this move by the Kaskaskia, but 
ultimately they could not force the Kaskaskia to stay. The 
geographical distance was over 100 miles and helped to 
ensure that these two bands would continue to develop in 
separate ways. The French established forts and towns in 
close proximity to the Kaskaskia, and the Kaskaskia began 
to adopt many of the European ways of life. For instance, 
the Kaskaskia established two mills for the production 
of wheat.19 By 1763, there were also “two hundred acres 
of cultivated land, a very good stock of cattle, and a 
brewery.”20 The structure of the confederacy allowed 
for strong localized bands with the ability to make many 
political choices on their own, and the Peoria were left to 
the north with a completely separate set of enemies from 
the Kaskaskia.
The Illinois confederacy allowed for individual bands 
to make a vast array of political decisions without the 
approval or consent of the other bands. One of the main 
reasons for the confederacy was to protect the similar 
culture of the Illinois bands. However, the bands were 
not obliged to protect the other bands during warfare, 
and no village could force another village into conflict. 
For instance, if the Peoria felt threatened by the Sioux, 
they could meet with the other villages and ask for their 
warriors’ help. However, if the elders of the other villages 
did not or could not provide help to the Peoria, then 
the Peoria fought the Sioux alone. There were several 
instances when all of the bands would provide warriors to 
fight off the Iroquois in the seventeenth century or the Fox 
during the early part of the eighteenth century. However, 
as time progressed the bands often began to favor more 
localized reasons for going to war. Instead of protecting a 
common culture or Illinois confederacy, they often chose 
to fight battles more relevant to their respective local 
politics.
The close alliance between the Kaskaskia and French 
often left the Kaskaskia making the decision to side with 
the French militarily, with the Kaskaskia joining them 
on several raids and battles against French enemies. For 
instance, in 1733 and 1736, the Kaskaskia participated 
in French-led expeditions against the Chickasaw. In the 
latter trip, more than 100 warriors from the Mississippi 
River villages took part in the expedition.21 During the 
1740s, Cherokee towns were even raided by French forces 
with the help of the Kaskaskia.22 The Chickasaw and 
Cherokee were not local enemies for the Kaskaskia, but 
the Kaskaskia used their warrior population to help build a 
strong alliance with the French. While these decisions did 
strengthen this alliance, it often left the Peoria more than 
a hundred miles to the north to defend their territory by 
themselves. 
The location of the Peoria also made them more 
susceptible to attacks from the Sioux. While the Peoria 
fought valiantly against these outside groups, they were 
beginning to waver in the 1750s after being attacked 
several years in a row. When the Peoria asked for help 
from the Kaskaskia or even for a French officer to be 
stationed among them, their request was not granted in 
time. The Peoria then lobbied the Cahokia and Tamaroa 
bands of the Illinois to join them at Lake Peoria, but to no 
avail.23 The Peoria were truly left to defend their land for 
themselves. 
The Peoria’s isolation did not mean that they were 
isolated from conflict and difficult decisions. After 
surviving numerous enemy attacks without much support 
from the other Illinois bands, the Peoria made the 
conscious choice to move west of the Mississippi River 
into Spanish Territory after the British began to enter the 
Illinois Country.
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was 
not an ideal time for the Illinois Indians. Throughout 
their history, the Illinois resourcefully took advantage of 
everything from the buffalo of the prairie to their Native 
American neighbors they used for slaves. However, the 
tides began to change when the Illinois bands began to 
separate and elect for a peaceful relationship with the 
United States. Renewed violence with the Foxes in the 
Portrait of Jacques Marquette on the memorial stele in the St. 
Ignace Mission, St. Ignace, Michigan. (Image: Collections of 
the Chateau Remezay)
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1770s helped to reduce 
the warrior population 
of the Illinois down to a 
mere 300 warriors.24 While 
the Peoria sought refuge 
across the Mississippi 
River in Spanish Territory, 
the Kaskaskia stayed east 
of the Mississippi, either 
near Kaskaskia or further 
south with the Quapaw.25 
The Fox, Kickapoos, and 
Potawatomis continued 
to harass the Kaskaskia 
throughout the eighteenth 
century; with a decreasing 
population, Kaskaskia 
chiefs had to take this threat 
very seriously. 
Ducoigne, the 
Kaskaskia chief, decided 
to support the United 
States over his Native 
American enemies who 
aligned themselves with the 
British. Much like previous 
chiefs, Ducoigne chose to 
go against his traditional 
Native American enemies, 
and the Kaskaskia even 
joined in the Revolutionary 
War on the side of the 
Americans. While most 
of their Native American 
enemies sided with the British, the Kaskaskia aided the 
rebels by hunting, scouting, and carrying correspondence. 
Forming an alliance with the Americans may seem like a 
reckless decision, but it was actually consistent with the 
Kaskaskia’s longstanding policy to align themselves with 
a powerful foreign nation. For the opportunistic Kaskaskia, 
they sought a foreign ally who could help them regain 
their prominence in the region over their Native American 
neighbors. Ducoigne became a staunch ally of George 
Rogers Clark when he took over the Illinois Country, and 
he even served as an American emissary to promote peace 
among the Wabash tribes and later to the Chickasaws.26
By positioning the Kaskaskia in an alliance with 
the Americans, Ducoigne made a calculated risk that the 
Americans would prove themselves to be more useful 
allies than their Native American enemies and that the 
United States could tip the balance of power back to the 
Kaskaskia. The same reasoning had been used to validate 
a French alliance in the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. However, this decision also made the Kaskaskia 
susceptible to Native Americans who openly opposed 
the United States. For example, in 1790 the Kaskaskia 
suffered heavy losses in battle with the Potawatomi, 
and in 1802 they were attacked by a series of Shawnee 
war parties.27 The Kaskaskia continued to suffer attacks 
by other tribes for their 
alliance with the United 
States. In 1804 and 1805, 
the Potawatomi raided the 
Kaskaskia and took several 
prisoners. The Kaskaskia 
survived these attacks, but 
their weakened warrior 
population led Ducoigne 
to use a more diplomatic 
approach toward his 
enemies.
Ducoigne knew that 
with his declining warriors 
he could not oppose the 
Potawatomi in an open 
war. Instead, he tried to 
persuade them to join the 
Kaskaskia and oppose 
the Osage, against whom 
the Potawatomi often 
went to war. Ducoigne 
invited the Potawatomi 
chief Saugeenawk and 
his Kaskaskia wife to a 
friendly visit.28 It was 
here that Ducoigne most 
likely unveiled his plan 
that the Potawatomi join 
Ducoigne and form a 
partnership against the 
Osage. In March of 1805, 
he threatened that 3,000 
warriors were marching 
from the Ohio Valley to punish the Osage for their raids 
and either destroy them or push them off their lands.29 
Ducoigne figured that if he could channel aggression 
away from his people and onto the Osage, he would be 
in a better position in the long run.30 The war with the 
Osage never materialized, but small-scale raids against 
the Osage did increase dramatically. A short-lived peace 
treaty among the Osage, Delaware, Miami, Potawatomi, 
Kickapoo, Sac, Fox, Sioux, and Kaskaskia was eventually 
signed in October of 1805.31 The increased pressure by 
Native American enemies forced Ducoigne to rely on 
foreign alliances, a trusted Kaskaskia tactic.
Ducoigne was a shrewd negotiator on behalf of his 
Kaskaskia people. At a meeting where Ducoigne led a 
delegation of western Indians, he addressed Washington 
on the encroachment of Kentuckians onto their land. 
Ducoigne stated at the meeting, “I am a Kaskaskia, and 
have always been a good American from my youth 
upwards.”32 Ducoigne stressed the fact that his people 
never once shed the blood of an American and maintained 
a strong alliance with the American people. After the 
United States’ victory at Fallen Timbers in August of 
1794, negotiations were held in Greenville, Ohio, the 
following year to settle the peace. While Ducoigne and 
his Kaskaskia people did not participate in the battle in 
Painted deer hide featuring arrowhead and broken diamond 
motif, attributed to the Illinois Indians, before 1796. (Image: 
Buffalo Bill Center of the West)
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any way, they were still 
included in the Greenville 
treaty. They received a 
$500 annuity and did not 
have to cede any land.33 
The Kaskaskia were being 
rewarded for their alliance 
with the United States.
This sense of elevated 
status would come back 
to haunt Ducoigne and 
his Kaskaskia people. The 
other Native Americans 
surrounding the Kaskaskia 
became increasingly 
hostile, especially after 
Ducoigne signed away 
thousands of acres of 
disputed land in an 1803 
treaty. The land that 
Ducoigne ceded to the 
United States was an 
area that the Kaskaskia 
had used for hunting in 
previous decades, but by 
1803 the Kickapoos were 
firmly established on this 
land. This action caused 
Ducoigne strife with the 
Kickapoos, but he avoided 
ceding the land where the 
Kaskaskia lived. Despite 
giving up hunting ground, 
Ducoigne retained enough 
land near the Mississippi River to sustain the Kaskaskia. 
Thus, instead of giving up his own land, Ducoigne sold 
out his enemies to strengthen his alliance with the United 
States. The signing of this treaty sparked some hostile 
exchanges between the Kickapoo and the Kaskaskia, 
and Ducoigne sought the protection of the United States. 
Governor Harrison wrote to the Kickapoos to say that 
the United States would not tolerate a war against the 
Kaskaskia. Harrison then told Ducoigne and his people 
to seek protection in the American village. These were 
minimal measures compared to what the Kaskaskia were 
used to from the French.
The splitting of the Illinois Confederacy occurred 
during the second half of the eighteenth century, but we 
can begin to see the effects of this split in the treaties of 
the nineteenth century. The Illinois never had a formal 
treaty with the French, but it was an alliance based on 
mutual assistance. The French provided trade goods and 
formed kinship bonds to strengthen this relationship. 
However, with the Illinois separating into smaller bands, 
we can see a move toward a more local concern in treaties. 
For instance, in the 1803 treaty the Kaskaskia, Cahokia, 
and Michigamea sought money for a priest in the region 
as well as funds to build a church. The Peoria never fully 
accepted the ideas of Christianity, so it is obvious they 
were not involved in this 
treaty-making process. The 
Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and 
Michigamea received land, 
monetary compensation, 
and, most importantly, 
a promise of protection 
from the United States 
against hostile incursions 
by other Native American 
groups.34 This protection 
was needed for the Illinois, 
who had been living in a 
“barbarous” region that 
had been plagued with 
violence since the French 
left.35 The Illinois Indians 
faced constant attacks 
during this period, and 
they desperately sought the 
protection that this treaty 
offered. However, article 
two of the treaty not only 
allowed for protection 
by the United States, but 
also implied a dominion 
by the United States over 
these Illinois bands. This 
is strikingly similar to 
article three of the treaties 
signed at Portage des Sioux 
in 1815. Those Native 
Americans agreed “to be 
under the protection of the 
United Sates, and of no other nation, power, or sovereign, 
whatsoever.”36 These treaties helped open the door for 
American expansion, as well as American authority over 
western tribes.
The Peoria signed a separate treaty with the United 
States in 1818 that confirmed their split with Kaskaskia. 
The Peoria, also decimated by a declining population, 
sought the protection of the other Illinois bands. Since 
the mid-eighteenth century, the Peoria had largely settled 
separately from the other bands, but years of warfare had 
taken their toll on them. This treaty stated that the Peoria 
lived apart from the other tribes and were not part of the 
previous treaty in 1803, so they did not reap any of the 
benefits of the annuities paid to the other bands.37 In this 
treaty, the Peoria signed away the remaining lands south 
and east of the Illinois River that was not ceded by the 
Kaskaskia. In return, the Peoria received annuities from 
the United States in addition to the “immediate care and 
patronage” as well as the “protection” of the United States 
against other Indian tribes.38 This language of care and 
protection runs through many of the Native American 
treaties of this region. However, the governmental reach 
of the Unites States often did little to protect the Illinois. 
This might be one reason why the Peoria amalgamated 
themselves back into the Illinois confederacy. Even 
Kaskaskia Indian. (Image: Engraving from a sketch by 
General George-Victor Collot, 1796)
54 | The Confluence | Spring/Summer 2016
though the Illinois confederacy was a shell of its former 
prominence, there was still more protection to be offered 
from the kinship between bands rather than the distant 
United States government.
The Illinois began the eighteenth century as dominant 
players in the region by making strategic alliances with 
European nations. Over the course of a century, these 
two groups made decisions that would benefit local bands 
rather than the larger political entity. This emphasis on 
local autonomy ultimately led to the fracturing of the 
Illinois bands that would not be resolved until they were 
forced to unite in the nineteenth century to survive hostile 
incursions. Peaceful overtures to the United States did not 
guarantee peace in the region for the Illinois, who suffered 
attacks from enemies who despised their decision to side 
with the Americans. The American treaties weakened the 
position of the Illinois and opened this region for later 
expansion. The peaceful action of negotiating with the 
United States opened up the Illinois to many unforeseen 
consequences that included violent outside attacks from 
rival Native Americans and the fracturing of the Illinois 
Confederacy. 
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